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A divided Maryland Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that police cannot pull over drivers who are merely touching their cell phones while behind the wheel, actions that could be permitted under the state鈥檚 distracted driving laws.
鈥淚t is clear that not every driver observed manipulating, or even touching, or pressing the screen of a cell phone while driving can reasonably be suspected of violating the law,鈥� wrote Justice Shirley M. Watts for the majority in聽.
Maryland鈥檚 distracted driving laws prohibit writing, sending or reading a text message behind the wheel, but they do allow for using GPS, calling 911 and other exceptions. As long as there is a possible legal explanation, Watts wrote, police do not automatically have grounds for a traffic stop.
But Justice Steven B. Gould, in a dissent joined by Justices Jonathan Biran and Angela M. Eaves, said the majority鈥檚 ruling would have 鈥渟ignificant鈥� practical consequences.
鈥淯nder the Majority鈥檚 analysis, an officer who witnesses a driver commit what could be a criminal offense 鈥� such as typing a text message to a friend 鈥� cannot conduct an investigatory stop because the officer cannot rule out that the driver was instead pressing the screen to terminate a call or enter a GPS address,鈥� Gould wrote.
The reasonable suspicion that officers need to make a stop 鈥渢olerates ambiguity鈥� and allows the stop so police can determine if the action is illegal or innocuous.
鈥淎s a result, Maryland鈥檚 distracted driving laws have been largely rendered unenforceable before a tragedy occurs鈥攁 consequence not compelled by the Fourth Amendment and at odds with the policy judgment that animated the General Assembly鈥檚 decision to enact these laws in the first place.鈥�
The decision stems from a 2023 traffic stop of Michael Eugene Stone by two Hagerstown Police officers who said they observed Stone 鈥渕anipulating鈥� a cell phone attached to his vehicle鈥檚 dashboard or windshield after seeing his phone screen brighten.
After the stop, the officers found fentanyl on Stone, leading to his arrest and charge on three counts of unlawful possession of fentanyl. Stone was not charged for distracted driving.
At trial, Stone attempted to suppress the evidence from the vehicle, claiming the search 鈥� his attorney said in court that Stone was 鈥渆ffectively strip searched on the side of the road鈥� 鈥� was improper.
Stone鈥檚 motion was denied by the circuit court judge, who said that even though neither officer claimed that Stone was texting or calling while driving, the simple act of touching a phone warranted reasonable suspicion.
But the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed that ruling in October, concluding that Stone鈥檚 actions did not inherently show criminal intent. They determined that the officers did not distinguish whether he was texting or whether he appeared distracted.
鈥淭estimony from the officers describing why they believed [ Stone] was violating traffic laws [was] limited: 鈥榌I]t appeared like he was typing a message鈥� and 鈥業 saw him pressing the screen while driving,鈥� according to the Appellate Court decision.
The Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed. Watts wrote that evidence must go beyond a police officer鈥檚 statement of reasonable suspicion 鈥� the facts of the case must also be 鈥渙ut of the ordinary鈥� and 鈥渞ule out a substantial portion of innocent travelers,鈥� she wrote.
In Stone鈥檚 case, Watts argued, a singular act of touching a cell phone is ambiguous enough that reasonable suspicion cannot be applied.
鈥淲here a police officer observes a driver manipulating, touching, or pressing the screen of a phone, without additional information, a reasonable and prudent officer would not be justified in conducting a stop to investigate a violation of the traffic laws governing use of a mobile phone while driving,鈥� Watts wrote.
Gould said the majority鈥檚 ruling 鈥渄emands too much of officers鈥� before making a stop.
鈥淏y requiring officers to rule out exceptions to the prohibition before making a stop, the Majority鈥檚 holding effectively neuters Maryland鈥檚 distracted driving statutes as a tool for preventing tragic auto accidents,鈥� Gould wrote.
The Maryland Attorney General鈥檚 office, through a spokesperson, declined to comment on the ruling Wednesday.
But Douglas Nivens II, the public defender who represented Stone, praised the Supreme Court鈥檚 ruling, saying that officers who conduct stops under reasonable suspicion must聽 鈥渁rticulate specific facts.鈥�
鈥淭his opinion also follows longstanding Federal and Maryland precedent that conduct that a large number of drivers exhibit cannot be the grounds for reasonable, articulable suspicion,鈥� Nivens said in a statement.
鈥淲e hope this opinion concludes Mr. Stone鈥檚 case so that he can live peacefully without fear of re-imprisonment,鈥� he wrote.
